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Abstract 
This paper explores the impact of competition on inequality by developing a new model to illustrate 
how higher profits from market power, and associated higher prices, could influence the distribution of 
wealth and income. We analyse data from eight OECD countries – Canada, France, Germany, Korea, 
Japan, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States. In an average country in the sample, market 
power increases the wealth of the richest 10% by between 12% and 21% for a range of reasonable 
assumptions about savings behaviour, while it reduces the income of the poorest 20% by 11% or more. 
The results contribute to the economic literature on the origins of inequality, suggesting that lack of 
competition may be one source of economic inequality.  
JEL Classifications: D31, D42, D63 
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Recent economic research finds stagnation in median wages and an increased disparity between the 
incomes of different groups of the population.1 Understanding the contributing factors to inequality is 
important if policymakers wish to reverse these tendencies. While there is much dispute about the origins 
of inequality, traditional explanations include a reduction in fiscal transfers from rich to poor, differences 
in human capital value or differences in demand for different types of workers. Increasingly, market 
power – defined as the ability to drive prices and returns above competitive levels – has also been 
identified as contributing to some extent to greater inequality. This has been noted by Ennis and Kim 
(2017), Furman and Orszag (2015), Rognlie (2015), Baker and Salop (2016), Creedy and Dixon (1999), 
as well as Comanor and Smiley (1975).  
 The existence of market power has a dual effect on the income distribution, not only generating 
higher economic profits2 for business owners, but also imposing higher prices on consumers. The 
wealthy, while paying more for goods, will at the same time receive higher profits from market power, 
due to their generally higher ownership of the stream of corporate profits and capital gains. The increased 
margins charged to customers as a result of market power will disproportionately harm the poor who 
will pay more for goods without receiving a counter-balancing share of increased profits. For example, 
Hausman and Sidak (2004) find evidence that poorer telecommunications consumers are more exposed 
to monopolisation.  
 The role of market power in explaining income and wealth disparities is particularly relevant in 
a global context where profit margins are increasing over time. Recent research, such as De Loecker and 
Eeckhout (2017), shows that mark-ups have increased substantially in the U.S. between 1950 and 2014, 
and suggests that this can be attributed to market power. Weche and Wambach (2018) find a similar 
evolution of mark-ups for a more recent time period in Europe, observing like De Loecker and Eeckhout 
(2017) a similar pattern of a drop in mark-ups during the financial crises followed by a recovery. Further 
evidence of rising mark-ups in the United States is documented by Gutiérrez and Phillippon (2016) and 
Gutiérrez (2017). 
  While mechanisms by which market power can affect inequality are increasingly recognised,3 
the extent to which they may account for inequality is still open question. Little research has focused on 
the potential size of market power’s impact on inequality, with the exception of a study for the United 
States by Comanor and Smiley (1975), subsequently updated and extended to other countries by Ennis 




suggested to contain substantial limits. There has been little analysis of the effects of competition on 
income or wealth distribution overall using alternative, more recent approaches.  
 Our paper helps to fill that gap by proposing a new model that addresses substantial model 
limitations that existed in prior work. By making a comparative static analysis between two different 
scenarios, one with existing levels of market power and another with competition enhanced, we model 
the potential impacts of market power on wealth distributions for eight OECD countries: Canada, 
France, Germany, Korea, Japan, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States. The countries were 
selected to ensure coverage of a large share of the world’s wealth, in light of data availability. The wealth 
distribution data comes from the OECD Wealth Database or, in the two cases where the reported data 
are not at the required level of detail, from commonly cited alternative sources.4 
 While this paper focuses on the benefits of increasing competition, it does not suggest that all 
sources of economic market power should be eliminated. Some degree of product market power is 
desirable to provide sustained incentives to innovate. Patents, trademarks and brand differentiation, for 
example, often involve creation of market power accompanied by a positive impact on incentive to 
innovate. Similarly, some degree of market power is an essential spur to investment, which is why 
competition laws generally do not prohibit market power as such but rather its “abuse” to restrict 
competition.  
 Some observers may suggest that illegitimate market power could not play a significant role in 
creating inequality. Indeed, only if market power is economically significant can it reasonably have 
major effects on inequality. There are reasons to consider the overall effects of illegitimate or 
undesirable market power as significant. Much anti-competitive behaviour by firms is hidden, because 
it is illegal. However, the business activities of discovered cartels already show a broad range of affected 
sectors. Accounting for both prosecuted and undiscovered cartels, and assuming comparable economic 
commerce of discovered and undiscovered cartels, Ennis (2014) suggests cartel commerce may amount 
to about USD 2 trillion per year, and that anti-competitive price increases from cartels are in the range 
of USD 200-600 billion per year.  
 Similarly, estimating the total rents accruing to firms protected from competition by unnecessary 
anticompetitive regulation is challenging. However, a study carried out by OECD (Wolfl et al., 2010) 
found evidence that less restrictive product market regulations may have a significant impact on growth. 
In particular, the study estimates that reducing barriers to entrepreneurship (such as barriers to entry and 




members would allow an average OECD country to obtain a 0.35% to 0.4% higher annual growth rate 
of GDP per capita.   
 Finally, while many modern commentators seek to distance competition law and policy from 
distributional concerns, it is worth noting that the origins of antitrust law lie very much in concerns 
about the concentration of wealth. In the United States, the antitrust laws were introduced explicitly to 
counter monopolisation of the economy not because of concerns about ‘efficiency’ but rather about 
undue political influence stemming from the wealth of the owners of the “trusts” (Baker and Salop, 
2016).  
 The results of this paper can inform the debate over whether consumer surplus standards have 
more attractive features than total welfare standards for evaluating competition and innovation policies, 
as it turns out the alternatives have substantially different distributional consequences. The profits 
included in total welfare calculations are distributed primarily to the wealthiest segment of the 
population, while the consumer surplus that is in both standards is distributed more broadly. The choice 
over whether to prefer one standard over the other is important because it can have a direct result on 
regulatory policy, competition law case outcomes and policies towards innovation.5 
 This paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 derives and explains the model that underlies the 
analysis. Section 3 discusses the data used to calibrate this model. Section 4 presents the results for all 
the countries in the analysis. Section 5 concludes and provides directions for future work. 
2. Model 
The dynamic steady-state model that we propose captures the potential effect that higher prices would 
have on different groups of the population based on actual income and wealth distributions, but does not 
characterise all relevant phenomena related to inequality and market power. The model is steady-state 
in the sense that it yields income and wealth distributions that remain constant over time, in a long-run 
scenario where the economic growth rate and level of market power are stable. Such a model allows us 
to compare how income and wealth distributions would change when moving from the current level of 
market power to an alternate equilibrium that could exist with competitive mark-ups and thus without 
excess market power. 
 For this purpose, we make a comparative static analysis between two alternative steady states: 
the first is the current state where business owners have market power and which is characterised by 




steady-state where markets are competitive and distributions of wealth, income and consumption 
expenditures are implied by the model and the reduction in mark-ups. We do not suggest that the 
economies examined are actually in steady state, but rather that the approach is a reasonable 
approximation to capture the essential features needed to compare long-run situations with more or less 
competition. 
 The use of our model to measure the redistributive effect of market power includes several 
assumptions that are worth noting. One is that market power for each country can be approximated by 
the difference between the average mark-up (across all sectors) in the country and a minimum mark-up 
that reflects the most competitive sectors across the group of studied economies.6 The method is further 
explained below and is designed to recognise that a significant level of mark-up is needed to cover 
necessary returns on investment and legitimate sources of market power such as patents and trademarks. 
Another is that the marginal propensity to save (𝑠′) from increased income arising from lower prices is 
constant across wealth groups. This assumption simplifies the solution to the model, but does not prevent 
the average saving rate from varying across wealth groups.7 The assumption is a conservative one since 
intuition suggests and simulations confirm that accommodating a higher marginal propensity to save for 
the wealthier will only increase the magnitude of the redistributive effects that we identify. Another is 
that market power gains are distributed in proportion to the current net wealth distribution (later referred 
to as fi). This reflects the observations that corporate income and capital gains are distributed via business 
ownership, so that those with the largest wealth shares (whether in the form of corporate shares, bonds, 
pension fund entitlements, dwellings, land or others) will, in proportion, receive the largest share of the 
profits.8 Finally, the price of different baskets of goods will be inflated by market power in an equal 
percentage. This implies that products for the poor and products for the wealthy will be equally affected 
by market power. To the extent that the poor are more exposed to monopolisation, the model provides 
conservative, lower-bound estimates.  
 Under these assumptions, we denote 𝑌 the total income in the economy, 𝐹 net wealth assets, 𝐶 
the aggregate consumption expenditure, 𝑊 the labour income and 𝑅 the capital income. All variables 
are nominal and we will use the superscripts 𝑚 and 𝑐 to refer to the observed values in the monopolistic 
and competitive steady states, respectively. In addition, we consider 𝑔 the economic growth rate, ?̅? the 
average saving rate of the economy, 𝑠′ the marginal propensity to save, 𝛼𝐿 and 𝛼𝑘 the shares of labour 
and capital income in the monopolistic steady-state, and 𝜇 the mark-up, defined as the price over 




 As we want to isolate the redistributive effect of market power, we consider that the only impact 
of monopolies is to raise prices, while real output remains constant. Thus, the difference between 
aggregate income, consumption expenditures and wealth in the monopolistic and competitive 
equilibrium is driven by the price increase. Under competition, the aggregate price is equal to average 
cost, and the following relations hold between wealth, income and consumption with market power 
(denoted by m) and without (denoted by c): 
𝐹𝑚 = 𝜇𝐹𝑐 , 𝑌𝑚 = 𝜇𝑌𝑐 , 𝐶𝑚 = 𝜇𝐶𝑐 .                                                   (1) 
 The relationships established in equation (1) imply that wealth, income and consumption are 
higher in the monopolistic equilibrium in nominal terms, as market power increases the price level in 
the economy, though in real terms they are assumed to remain constant across steady states. While 
efficiency effects are outside the scope of the model, in reality we would also expect market power to 
reduce aggregate output in real terms, resulting in a deadweight loss. It is not clear though how 
deadweight loss affects inequality, since both business owners and consumers are harmed by lost 
transactions. Still, we should expect efficiency effects to impact particularly the poorest groups of the 
population, since the households that reduce consumption are those with lowest willingness-to-pay and 
that cannot afford monopoly prices.  
2.1 National income identity  
The national income identity defines aggregate output as the sum of income from labour and capital: 
𝑌𝑗 = 𝑊 + 𝑅𝑗,           𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑗 = 𝑐,𝑚.                                                                (2) 
 Note that the change in price when we move to the competitive steady state does not affect 
labour income, which we assume remains constant across the two steady states. In fact, if market power 
increased prices and wages in the same proportion, the redistributive effect of market power would likely 
be negligible, since workers and business owners would be affected in the same way. We also do not 
know a priori how capital income is affected by market power, since doubling prices does not 
necessarily double the return on capital. However, we can use equations (1) and (2) to express 𝑅𝑐 in 
terms of 𝑅𝑚 (see Annex A0 for a complete derivation): 
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 Focusing now on population groups, the lower case letter i describes the shares of wealth y and 
income f of a particular population group. The income earned by a population group 𝑖 is, in each steady-
state, given by equations (4) and (5), mirroring equations (2) and (3) respectively: 
𝑦𝑖
𝑚𝑌𝑚 = 𝑊𝑖 + 𝑓𝑖
𝑚𝑅𝑚                                                                   (4) 
𝑦𝑖







].                                                       (5) 
 In equations (4) and (5), 𝑊𝑖 is the labour income earned by population group i, whose nominal 
level is not affected by market power (just as for aggregate labour income in equation (2)). Subtracting 
equation (5) from equation (4) and using the equalities in (1) and (2) (see Annex A1 for a complete 
derivation), we get: 
𝑦𝑖
𝑚 − 𝑦𝑖
𝑐 = (𝜇 − 1)(𝑓𝑖
𝑚 − 𝑦𝑖
𝑚) + (1 − 𝜇𝛼𝐿)(𝑓𝑖
𝑚 − 𝑓𝑖
𝑐).                                   (6) 
 Equation (6) states that the difference in income shares for group i, with and without market 
power, is an increasing function of the difference between the wealth share and income share of the 
group, and declines in the labour share (multiplied by the mark-up) times the wealth differential. This 
effectively suggests that a large labour share of income 𝛼𝐿 attenuates the impact of the wealth differential 
on the income differential of a population group. In other words, as the labour share of income increases, 
those groups with a high wealth differential (i.e. particularly benefitting from market power) will have 
a lower income differential (i.e. a smaller jump in income due to market power). 
2.2 Consumption function 
Next, we describe aggregate consumption expenditure using a linear consumption function with an 
independent term (autonomous consumption) and a constant marginal propensity to save, whose 
functional form can be derived from a linear expenditure model:9 
𝐶𝑗 = 𝐶̅𝑗 + (1 − 𝑠′)𝑌𝑗 , 𝑗 = 𝑐,𝑚.                                                          (7) 
 The particular functional form of the consumption function in equation (7) implies the following 
relation between the marginal propensity to save 𝑠′ and the average saving rate of the economy ?̅?: 
?̅? = 𝑠′ −
𝐶̅
𝑌
, 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 ?̅? =
𝑌𝑚 − 𝐶𝑚
𝑌𝑚




 The relation in equation (8) reflects the fact that, as long as autonomous consumption is positive, 
the average saving rate is lower than the marginal propensity to save, which is line with empirical 
evidence. Nonetheless, this relation also imposes that the ratio of autonomous consumption to income 
remains sufficiently small that the average saving rate is not negative.  
 Defining 𝑐𝑖 as the consumption share of a particular population group, the consumption 
expenditure of any population group can be described by the following equations: 
𝑐𝑖
𝑐𝐶𝑐 = 𝐶?̅?
𝑐 + (1 − 𝑠′)𝑦𝑖
𝑐𝑌𝑐                                                                    (9) 
𝑐𝑖
𝑚𝐶𝑚 = 𝐶?̅?
𝑚 + (1 − 𝑠′)𝑦𝑖
𝑚𝑌𝑚, 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝐶?̅?
𝑚 = 𝜇𝐶?̅?
𝑐 .                                    (10) 
𝐶?̅?
𝑐 and 𝐶?̅?
𝑚 are independent terms specific to the population group. Note that despite the simplifying 
assumption that all population groups react identically to a variation in income, the incorporation of 
group-specific independent terms allows average saving rates to vary across population groups, which 
is consistent with empirical evidence. Still, by equation (1), the average saving rate of the economy 
remains the same in the monopolistic and competitive scenarios, since market power affects 
consumption expenditure and income in the same proportion. Multiplying equation (9) by 𝜇 and 








𝑐).                                                         (11) 
 Equation (11) describes how consumption shares react to a change in income share, an effect 
that intuitively depends on the saving behaviour characterised by the marginal propensity to save and 
the average saving rate, with a higher marginal propensity to save converting into a lower consumption 
differential for group i compared to their income differential. 
2.3 Wealth dynamics  
We describe aggregate wealth in steady-state as the product of savings (aggregate income minus 
aggregate consumption expenditure) and a multiplier 
1
𝑔
, where 𝑔 can be interpreted as the growth rate 








 Equation (12) can be easily derived as the solution of a standard difference equation for wealth, 
by considering that in equilibrium wealth grows at the constant rate 𝑔.10 In equilibrium, the same relation 














.                                                                (14) 
 Multiplying all terms of equation (13) by 𝜇 and subtracting it from equation (14), one can show 













𝑐).                                                (15)  
 It must be noted that in the special case where 𝑔 takes the value zero, equation (12) does not 
hold and wealth is instead constant over time (𝐹𝑗 = ?̅?, 𝑗 = 𝑐,𝑚). In such a case, households do not 
make any savings; rather, they simply maintain previously accumulated wealth. The wealth share of 
households is thus fully determined by initial conditions and is not affected by the existence of market 
power (though market power would still have an impact on the income share of households). However, 
this scenario is unlikely, as it would require both inflation and real output growth to be systematically 
zero in the long term. 
2.4 Production function  
Lastly, while explicitly defining a production function is not necessary to derive the solution of the 
model, this final step allows us to clarify some underlying assumptions about the cost structure of the 
economy and to close the model. We define the production technology of the economy as a standard 
Cobb-Douglas production function that converts labour (𝐿) and capital (𝐾) into real output (Yj Pj⁄ ) at 
constant returns to scale. This means that in the long run, when both labour and capital can be adjusted, 
the marginal cost is constant and equals average cost. 
𝑌𝑗
𝑃𝑗
= 𝐴𝐿𝜃𝐾1−𝜃, 𝑗 = 𝑐,𝑚.                                                         (16) 
 
 Within this production function, A stands for total factor efficiency and it grows at the 




in the absence of inflation the total income 𝑌 also grows at the rate 𝑔 (although considering a positive 
inflation rate or population growth would not affect the solution of the model). 
 From the production function in equation (16) it is possible to calculate the aggregate labour 





𝐿.                                                                         (17) 
 Combining equations (16) and (17), and considering that 𝑃𝑚 = 𝜇𝑃𝑐, the following 
relationship between the mark-up and the labour share of income holds: 
𝜇𝛼𝐿 = 𝜃, 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 0 < 𝜃 < 1.                                                       (18) 
 Equation (18) implies that, under the law of diminishing marginal productivity of labour (𝜃 <
1), the product of the mark-up by the income share of labour must be lower than one. This is generally 
true for all countries considered in this paper. As seen next, the term 𝜇𝛼𝐿 plays a fundamental role in 
the adjustment formula translating the impact of market power on wealth and income inequality. 
2.5 Solving the model  
The system of equations (6), (11) and (15) characterise the equilibrium dynamics of wealth, income and 
consumption shares. Solving the system with respect to 𝑓𝑖
𝑐 and 𝑦𝑖
𝑐, we obtain our final measure of the 
























𝑚).                                                  (20) 
 Equations (19) and (20) provide the simple result that the redistributive effects of market power 
on wealth and income depend on a few key variables that can be either observed or estimated: a market-
power indicator (mark-up); the income share of labour; the ratio between the average saving rate and 
the marginal propensity to save; and the observed difference between income and wealth shares in the 
presence of market power. Moreover, the two equations show that a reduction of market power will 




then) the corresponding wealth share. These two equations are used to calculate the effects of market 
power on wealth and income reported in this paper. 
2.6 Lower bounds 
 It is possible to simplify the model, with two additional assumptions, in order to obtain an 
intuitive formula that can be used as a lower bound for the impact of market power on wealth and income 
inequality. If the marginal propensity to save were to equal the average saving rate – which is the same 





















𝑚).                                                 (22) 
where L is the Lerner index.11  This suggests that the wealth share difference between the competitive 
and market power states, for a group i, can also be expressed as a differential between its income and 
wealth shares, increasing as a function of market power, while falling in value as the labour share 
increases. 
 Moreover, if we also assume that the marginal productivity of labour is constant, in which case 






𝑚 = (𝜇 − 1)(𝑦𝑖
𝑚 − 𝑓𝑖
𝑚).                                            (23) 
 While the assumptions that the average saving rate equals the marginal propensity to save and 
that the marginal productivity of labour is constant are unlikely to be observed in reality, they both 
reduce the estimated impact of market power to its minimum. Equation (23) hence provides a lower 






This section describes the variables and data used to calibrate the model and their underlying sources. 
The eight countries considered have been selected both because of data availability and to ensure 
geographic breadth. To the extent possible, data sources have been used that are common across these 
countries to ensure comparability. Data sources are listed in Table 1.  
3.1 Market power indicator 
The extent of market power is measured using mark-ups on average cost reported by Høj et al. (2007), 
who used the method developed by Roeger (1995)12 adapted from Hall (1988) to estimate sector-specific 
mark-ups for 17 countries, using the OECD-STAN database. The method includes a return on capital 
that is excluded from the calculation of the mark-up.  The data used for these estimates covers the period 
1975-2002 and is not purported to represent current mark-ups but rather average mark-ups over that 
time period in which wealth stocks have been built up. Mark-ups therefore may have changed since 
then, and the countries with higher mark-ups in these data are not necessarily those with the highest 
mark-ups now. Arguably, though, these historical mark-ups, which are certainly among the most 
detailed estimates available, would have played a role in establishing today’s wealth distribution.  
 Mark-ups are imperfect measures of competition, and the estimation method used by Høj et al. 
is recognised as providing only a first-order approximation. Measurement problems are also observed 
when working with input and output measures at the sectoral level. Nonetheless, mark-ups are 
commonly used to measure the strength of competition (Bresnahan, 1989, Schmalansee, 1989). 
Macroeconomic research in particular often relies on mark-up information to examine the impact of 
competition on economy wide factors, such as Aghion et al. (2005), Griffiths et al. (2006) and Thum-
Thysen and Canton (2015) and most recently De Loecker and Eeckhout (2017) and Weche and 
Wambach (2018), for example, which find increased mark-ups in recent times compared to the historical 
patterns. The mark-ups used in this paper have the feature of extensive sector disaggregation by country 
while resting in line with those of other authors (e.g., Griffiths et al., 2006); the differences between this 
paper’s competitive and market power mark-ups are no greater than the mark-up differences found in a 
historical perspective, such as those reported in De Loecker and Eeckhout (2017).  
 While the mark-ups estimated by Høj et al. (2007) could be directly introduced into the model 
to measure the total impact of market power on the distribution of wealth, we do not believe that a 
complete eradication of mark-ups is a viable or desirable policy objective, as some sources of market 




we attempt to compare actual mark-ups with the lowest sector specific mark-ups observed across 
countries, in order to estimate an unexplained or excess mark-up. The model can then simulate the effect 
of market power by calculating the wealth distribution that would exist if the excess mark-up does not 
exist.  
 The estimates of excess mark-up by country-sector are calculated, for each of the 18 sectors, as 
the difference between the actual mark-up and the lowest observed mark-up across all countries in the 
sample for each sector. To illustrate, in the sector of wholesale and retail trade and repairs, the mark-up 
observed in the UK is 16% and the minimum mark-up (found in Germany) is 12%. The UK excess 
mark-up for that sector is then calculated as the difference, i.e. 4.0%. Weighting across excess mark-ups 
for each sector by output, the average level of the excess mark-up in the UK is 3.9%. The average mark-
ups by country (across sectors) are shown in Table 2, with the excess mark-up ranging between 3.9% 
and 10.6%.  
 This method of estimating market power focuses on finding likely cross-country differences in 
mark-ups, but it is not claimed to serve as a definitive measure of market power for any individual 
country. Moreover, these measures are not claimed to serve as a current indicator but instead as an 
approximation of long-run differences of market power across countries, as the underlying data used to 
estimate the mark-ups covered about 30 years. It is possible that our estimates of excess mark-ups may 
exceed reported values on corporate profits, because not all profits are captured in corporate profit 
measures (e.g., partnership income from investment funds or professional service firms) and because a 
share of profit may be taken in income. Higher than minimal mark-ups, or the excess mark-up, may then 
be transferred into higher returns to shareholders (and profits), but also potentially into higher income 
for managers and other employees (e.g., from managerial profit-taking or collective bargaining that 
extracts part of a monopoly rent). Indeed, in some companies with high profits, such as financial firms, 
a great part of the income goes to a small, high-earning percentage of the employees, as shown in Denk 
et al. (2015). 
3.2 Wealth and income shares 
The difference between a population group’s share of total income and its share of total wealth is 𝑦𝑖 −
𝑓𝑖.
13 This difference drives the accumulation of gains from market power for those with a share of 
business ownership (wealth) that exceeds their share of income, i.e., for 𝑓𝑖 > 𝑦𝑖. In contrast, for those 
with shares of income that exceed their share of business profits, 𝑓𝑖 < 𝑦𝑖, the impact of market power 
will be a net loss in both wealth and income. Intuitively, market power generates a transfer effect from 




capital they hold). This means that the families that lose the most from market power, in absolute as 
opposed to percentage terms, are likely to be those with a substantial income but low business 
ownership; this appears consistent with the observation that a “squeezed middle class” has experienced 
a sustained drop in real income. 
 Among the 8 countries studied here, wealth asset ownership of the top 1 percentile ranges from 
6% to 37% of total wealth, while asset ownership of the bottom 80 percentiles ranges from 12% to 43% 
of total. We use wealth asset ownership by wealth group as our indicator of business ownership. The 
top percentile groups, particularly the 95-99th percentile and the top 1 percentile have an income share 
of total income that is generally much lower than their percentage of wealth.  
 These findings support the point that the wealthiest households may receive disproportionately 
more of the profits from market power than others while not being equally affected by price increases 
as other groups. We note that the impact of competition on earnings is not unambiguous. Some  labour 
studies find that even some lower-skilled workers may share in supra-competitive rents earned by firms, 
as discussed in Furman and Orszag (2015). In such cases, the profit transfers that are the basis of the 
model would be both to business asset owners and to those workers that are in a position to capture the 
rents earned by the business. This effect is not considered in the model used here; while it may be 
particularly important in heavily unionised sectors, it may be less important in others and even counter-
balanced, from a distributional perspective, for workers who can influence their own pay (such as CEOs 
and executive teams, or in financial firms, where the key workers benefitting from most profit 
distribution tend to be a relatively small portion of workers, as shown in Denk et al (2015). 
3.3 Income share of labour 
The income share of labour corresponds to the fraction of total income or output that is earned from 
labour, usually in the form of wages. The specific measure we use is adjusted for self-employment, 
whose remuneration is not defined as wages, but which should still be considered as a part of labour 
income. The data was collected from the Ameco database and it is reported in Krämer (2011). The values 
are quite stable across countries and they range between 0.62 and 0.7.  
3.4 Marginal propensity to save over average saving rate 
The marginal propensity to save (𝑠’) is the proportion of a marginal increase in household income that 
is used for saving or, in other words, that is not allocated for consumption. Thus, the marginal propensity 




is the share of the total income that is saved by the household, that is, it corresponds to the ratio of 
savings to income. 
 The ratio of the marginal propensity to save (MPS) to the average saving rate is one of the key 
parameters of our model.  The ratio influences the scale of the impact that market power has on 
inequality. To ensure that we use the best available evidence for this parameter, we therefore surveyed 
the literature on savings rates (see annex A6 for more detail).  
 The issue here is the effect of a permanent and unanticipated reduction of market power on 
consumption and savings. Reputable studies of permanent and unanticipated changes in income are 
summarised in Annex A6. Among the studies considered, the average 𝑠′ is 0.16 but this varies across 
different countries and ranges between 0.11 and 0.23. 
 With respect to the average saving rate, we use data collected by national statistical offices for 
recent decades. The average of these savings rates is 0.11, and ranges between 0.08 and 0.12, with the 
exception of France whose saving rate was around 0.17.   The average ratio between the marginal 
propensity to save (MPS) and the average saving rate for the four countries for which we were able to 
obtain estimates was 1.9, though this varied from 1.5 to 2.4. In order to capture a lower bound on the 
impact, we use a ratio of 1 of the MPS to the average savings rate, though we consider this an unrealistic 
scenario. For our primary calculations, we use two ratios that are closer to the calculated averages (1.5 
and 2).  
4. Results 
The main results on wealth impacts are presented in Table 3.14 For each wealth group, actual wealth 
shares are reported as well as shares absent market power. The range of results that is derived from 
different ratios of marginal propensity to save over average saving rate is indicated in separate columns.  
 Table 3 suggests that, in this model and for the countries studied, redistribution from eliminating 
market power would occur mainly from the wealthiest 10% of the population to the bottom 80%. Table 
4 summarises the percentage of wealth affected by the existence of market power across countries for 
the wealthiest 10%. For an average country in the sample, 12% to 21% of the wealth of the richest 10% 
of households (by wealth) reflects the presence of market power. This result is calculated by calibrating 
the ratio of the marginal propensity to save over the average saving rate between 1.5 and 2, the values 
of the ratio most consistent with the available data. Table 4 also reports a lower bound value for the 




case the wealth attributed to market power would be 6%, showing a non-trivial share of wealth even 
under the most conservative assumption for the ratio. The differences in the impact of market power 
across countries arise from the differences in the distribution of wealth and income, observed mark-ups 
and income shares of labour. 
 An alternative measure of how market power influences wealth distribution, which does not 
involve the assumption of a full elimination in market power, is the impact of a reduction in mark-ups 
by 1%. As an example, a 1% reduction in mark-ups increases the wealth of the poorest 20% of the UK 
population by 0.19 percentage points. Their wealth therefore increases from 0.87% to 1.06% (an increase 
of approximately 22%). This marginal effect can be used to estimate the possible impact of reducing or 
eliminating anti-competitive market power for a given economy-wide price change. The extent to which 
middle income earners are squeezed by market power varies across countries, as can be seen by focusing 
on the 20th to 80th percentiles; in general, this group loses from market power, particularly between the 
20th to 60th percentiles, which would see their share of wealth rise from 14.0% to 20.7% on average 
absent market power, amounting to a 48% increase in wealth share. 
 In addition to looking at the impact on wealth, we also show in Table 5 how market power 
affects the income shares of the population groups in each country, while Table 6 summarises the 
percentage change in the income of the poorest 20% for all countries. In an average country in the 
sample, for a range of reasonable assumptions about saving behaviour, the income of the poorest 20% 
of households is expected to rise by more than 11%.15 We note that the income effects are particularly 
meaningful for the poorest households, which often hold close-to-zero or even negative levels of wealth. 
 Finally, the redistribution of income resulting from a reduction in mark-ups by 1% can be 
derived. Taking again the case of the United Kingdom, a 1% reduction in mark-ups increases the income 
of the poorest 20% of the UK population by 0.12 percentage points. Their income share therefore 
increases from 7.8% to 7.92% (an increase of approximately 1.5%). 
5. Conclusions 
This paper provides evidence that market power can contribute substantially to wealth inequality, 
augmenting wealth of the richest 10% of the population on average by 12% to 21%, depending on the 
choice of key model parameters relating to saving behaviour, and reducing the income of the poorest 
20% of the population by 11% or more. The groups of the population who are typically harmed by 
market power are the 0 to 80th percentiles, and interestingly the harm appears to be particularly 




differences in the magnitude of the effect of market power across countries, which are explained by 
differences in mark-ups, as well as disparities in the wealth distributions across jurisdictions. Arguably, 
these findings may inform the case for focusing on consumer welfare standards for policy decision-
making, as total welfare standards can yield substantially different policy outcomes, and distributional 
impacts, for the benefit of only a relatively small share of the population. 
            While the model proposed in this paper intends to provide a rough measure of the overall effect 
of market power on inequality it is important to note that the figures reported are in some respects quite 
conservative. For instance, by assuming that market power affects all prices in the same proportion, the 
model fails to account for the ways that prices may become particularly inflated for the most essential 
and inelastic goods, reinforcing thereby the harm to the poor. Likewise, our results might be 
underestimated due to the fact that market power may not only increase the prices of final goods, but 
may also limit wage growth, thus reinforcing inequality. 
            Moreover, although all forms of market power can generally exacerbate inequality, this is not to 
suggest that market power is always undesirable. There are many generally considered legitimate 
sources of market power, such as intellectual property protection for products, processes or brands, 
which protect the process of innovation. However, violations of competition law, government-created 
barriers to entry or natural monopolies may be significant sources of market power that reinforce 
inequality without a positive trade-off on innovation.  
            Overall, these findings suggest several valuable avenues for future research. First, extending the 
analysis to developing countries would be interesting, which should be possible as data measuring 
inequality are rapidly becoming more easily available. Second, more work is needed to understand the 
likely scale of legitimate and illegitimate sources of market power. Such figures would provide an 
underpinning for one of the key variables for this analysis. Third, using econometric techniques to 
regress wealth on measures of market power would be of substantial value, allowing one to obtain 






1 See, for example, Atkinson (2008), Piketty (2014), Piketty and Saez (2003), and OECD (2015). 
2 That is, returns above the market return, which should be competed down to the cost of capital. 
3 See, for example, Furman and Orszag (2015) on regulatory sources of market power and Baker and Salop (2015) 
on competition law violations. 
4 For Korea and Japan, the sources are listed in Table 1. Other sources such as CSFB report higher estimates of 
wealth and financial wealth for the top 1% in these two countries in particular. 
5 For example, Farrell and Shapiro (1990) suggest that horizontal mergers would often increase total welfare that 
includes firm profits, while not consumer welfare, so the choice of standard has a significant impact on 
outcomes. Katz and Shelanski (2005) and Shapiro (2012) suggest that innovations tend to generate total 
welfare gains that include a large element of profit from intellectual property, potentially diluting the 
strength of some of the arguments for the benefits of innovation. 
6 On the one hand, low mark-ups may indicate a declining industry with uneconomic return on capital. On the 
other hand, the lowest mark-ups in an industry may already be expected to include some market power, 
to the extent that sector-wide perfect competition is rare. 
7 This assumption can be relaxed to yield marginal propensities to save that vary across wealth classes, but we note 
that this adjustment would actually imply higher shares of marginal savings for the highest wealth 
classes, further increasing the strength of the results reported below. The assumption is thus 
conservative, even if an over-simplification. 
8 Market power may potentially be shared with employees, including lesser paid workers. If the workers, notably, 
receive a substantial increase in their incomes as a result of market power, the distribution of profits 
will go not only to those with substantial net wealth but also to those without, thus weakening the result 
of this paper. While this point is important to consider, to the extent that union negotiating power has 
declined over time, and that top management pay has substantially outpaced inflation, redistribution via 
labour income, to the extent it occurs, may be accruing increasingly to the wealthiest workers (i.e., 
management).  
9 In the linear expenditure model, households' utility from consumption and saving is described by the following 
equation: 𝑈(𝐶, 𝑆) = (1 − 𝑠′)𝑙𝑛(𝐶 − 𝑎) + 𝑠′𝑙𝑛(𝑆). The maximisation of this utility function subject to 
the budget constrains yields the consumption function presented in equation (7). 
10 Consider that the dynamics of wealth are described by the difference equation 𝐹𝑡+1 = 𝐹𝑡 + 𝑌𝑡 − 𝐶𝑡. That is, the 
wealth accumulated in any period of time is equal to the wealth held in the previous period plus 
aggregate savings. Then, assuming that the economy grows at the exogenous growth rate 𝑔, the 
equilibrium solution of the difference equation is given by 𝐹𝑡+1 = 𝐹𝑡(1 + 𝑔) and, in steady-state, 
equation (12) holds. 
11 The Lerner index is equal to 
𝑃−𝐶
𝑃
, where P is the price and C the marginal cost, which in this case equals the 
average cost. 
12 Prior work using Roeger’s approach has included Oliveira Martins et al. (1996). 
13 While the population of the top wealth decile and top consumption decile are not perfectly overlapping, the 
authors believe there is a high correlation between consumption shares of the income for those persons 
in the xth wealth decile and those in the xth income decile. This approximation is used because data on 




                                                                                                                                                                      
the consumption shares of the top wealth decile was unavailable to the authors at the time of writing. 
Note that for Korea, Japan and the U.S., the consumption of the top 1 percentile had to be calibrated 
based on consumption shares in known countries.  
14 The data from Japan have a different source which is listed in Table 1. 
15 The income variations observed for the bottom quintiles of the population may actually exceed the price change 
percentage from reduced market power. This follows from the fact that wealth is an endogenous variable 
in the proposed model, meaning that the real income increase from absence of market power enables 
the bottom quintile of the population to save more and subsequently receive extra returns on wealth. As 
an illustrative example, in a country where prices fall by 1% as a result of pro-competitive policies, a 
household that initially does not hold wealth obtains an immediate raise in real income by 1%, allowing 
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Annex A0. Derivation of equation (3)  
From rewriting equation (2), note that: 
𝑅𝑐 = 𝑌𝑐 −𝑊. 










Noting from (2) that:  
 
𝑌𝑚 = 𝑊 + 𝑅𝑚 
 





Re-arranging and multiplying W by 
µ
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Annex A1. Derivation of equation (6)  
 
Subtracting equation (5) from equation (4): 
𝑦𝑖
𝑚𝑌𝑚 − 𝑦𝑖
𝑐𝑌𝑐 = 𝑊𝑖 + 𝑓𝑖



































(𝑊 + 𝑅𝑚). 

























Defining the labour share of income, 
𝑊
𝑌𝑚
, as 𝛼𝐿: 
𝜇𝑦𝑖
𝑚 − 𝑦𝑖




Rearranging the terms: 
𝑦𝑖
𝑚 − 𝑦𝑖
𝑐 = (1 − 𝜇)𝑦𝑖
𝑚 + 𝜇(1 − 𝛼𝐿)𝑓𝑖
𝑚 − (1 − 𝜇𝛼𝐿)𝑓𝑖
𝑐 . 
Adding and subtracting (1 − 𝜇)𝑓𝑖
𝑚 to the right-hand side of the previous equation: 
𝑦𝑖
𝑚 − 𝑦𝑖
𝑐 = (1 − 𝜇)𝑦𝑖
𝑚 − (1 − 𝜇)𝑓𝑖
𝑚 + (1 − 𝜇 + 𝜇(1 − 𝛼𝐿))𝑓𝑖
𝑚 − (1 − 𝜇𝛼𝐿)𝑓𝑖
𝑐 . 
Simplifying the third term from the right-hand side of the last equation: 
𝑦𝑖
𝑚 − 𝑦𝑖
𝑐 = (1 − 𝜇)𝑦𝑖
𝑚 − (1 − 𝜇)𝑓𝑖
𝑚 + (1 − 𝜇𝛼𝐿)𝑓𝑖





𝑐 = (𝜇 − 1)(𝑓𝑖
𝑚 − 𝑦𝑖







Annex A2. Derivation of equation (11) 





𝑐 + (1 − 𝑠′)𝑦𝑖
𝑚𝑌𝑚 − (1 − 𝑠′)𝑦𝑖
𝑐𝜇𝑌𝑐 . 
Taking into account that, as follows from equation (1), aggregate nominal variables under market power 





𝑐 + (1 − 𝑠′)𝑦𝑖
𝑚𝑌𝑚 − (1 − 𝑠′)𝑦𝑖
𝑐𝑌𝑚. 
Likewise, because real autonomous consumption is not affected by income or wealth, its value is 
constant in steady-state. Therefore, the same relation between nominal autonomous consumption under 







𝑚 + (1 − 𝑠′)𝑦𝑖
𝑚𝑌𝑚 − (1 − 𝑠′)𝑦𝑖
𝑐𝑌𝑚. 
Isolating the common factors: 
(𝑐𝑖
𝑚 − 𝑐𝑖
𝑐)𝐶𝑚 = (1 − 𝑠′)(𝑦𝑖
𝑚 − 𝑦𝑖
𝑐)𝑌𝑚. 
Dividing both sides of the equation by 𝐶𝑚: 
(𝑐𝑖
𝑚 − 𝑐𝑖





































Annex A3. Derivation of equation (15) 





















































𝑌𝑚 − (1 − ?̅?)𝑌𝑚
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1 − (1 − ?̅?)
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Annex A4. Derivation of equations (19) and (20) 

























Introducing the previous result into equation (6) 
𝑦𝑖
𝑚 − 𝑦𝑖
𝑐 = (𝜇 − 1)(𝑓𝑖
𝑚 − 𝑦𝑖












































Annex A5. Estimating competitive mark-ups 
 
In this annex we set out the methodology for estimating a competitive mark-up against which to 
compare estimated actual mark-ups. We obtained estimates of the price mark-up over average cost for 
18 sectors across 17 countries from Høj et al. (2007). We drop Luxembourg as an outlier due to its small 
size. See Table A5.1 below.  
Table A5.1. Mark-ups estimates: industry detail 
. 
By comparing the mark-ups across different countries, we identified the lowest, most 
competitive mark-up in each sector. For each sector we then calculate the difference between a 
countries’ mark-up and the lowest observed mark-up. For example, in the sector of wholesale and retail 
trade and repairs, the lowest mark-up (found in Germany) is 12% while Canada has a mark-up of 16% 
in that sector. We then say that Canada faces a 4% excess mark-up in that sector. We average these 
excess mark-ups across sectors to find Canada’s average excess mark-up (which is 9.67%). We also 
calculate a weighted average excess mark-up for each country by using the OECD’s STAN database to 
identify a country specific weight for each sector in each country (this reduces the excess mark-up in 
Canada to 7.58%).  
In notation, the observed mark-up in sector o and country n (with whatever market power exists 
in a sector) is 𝜇𝑜,𝑛
𝑚 . The minimum (most competitive) mark-up found across all countries n (from n=1 







𝑚 , … , 𝑢𝑜,𝑁
𝑚 }.. 
That is, we take the most competitive mark-up for a sector to be the minimum observed for that 
sector across all countries in the sample. To the extent that a fully competitive situation is unlikely, 
except for commodity products, this minimum observed mark-up is a conservative (i.e., high) estimate 
of the competitive mark-up. The excess mark-up for a given sector o in a given country n is the 
difference between the observed mark-up for sector o in country n and the minimum mark-up for sector 





To arrive at a figure representing a country’s overall excess mark-up, we weight the excess 
mark-up for each sector by the size of that sector (eo,n) in that country’s economy, yielding a weighted 
excess mark-up of: 
𝜇𝑛
𝑒 = ∑  𝑒𝑜,𝑛𝜇𝑜,𝑛
𝑒𝑂
𝑜=1 . 
Table 2 presents the results. Since we use differences in the sector mark-ups between countries, 
we are able to ensure that the results are not driven by the variations in mark-ups across sectors. 
“Competitive mark-ups” are estimated using the minimum mark-ups observed across countries. They 
are probably overestimated since market-based sectors are, over the long run, unlikely to have any 
sector level mark-ups below the competitive level. If competitive mark-ups are, in fact, overestimated, 
than the price change attributed to market-power is underestimated and the redistribution effect is also 






Annex A6. The marginal propensity to save 
 
The ratio of the marginal propensity to save to the average savings rate is a key parameter of the 
model to examine the effects of market power. Table A6.1 sets out the results of our literature survey 
of estimates of the marginal propensity to save (MPS) from a permanent shock in income. Table A6.2 
set out estimates of the average saving rate from countries with an estimate of MPS, and calculates the 
value of the ratio where possible. It identifies the ratio for the average country as 1.9.   
Table A6.1. Marginal propensity to save (MPS) from a permanent shock in income 





United States. Household data from the 
Consumer Expenditure Survey, Survey of 
Consumer Finances and Panel Study of 
Income Dynamics.  The MPS range was 
extracted from the first column in Table 9. The 
central value corresponds to the average of all 
reported figures. 
Dynan, K. E., J. Skinner and S. P. Zeldes (2004), 
“Do the rich save more?”, Journal of Political 




United States. Data collected from lottery 
players in Massachusetts in the 80s. For the 
authors’ preferred specification, the MPS is 
estimated at 16% (Table 6 – the authors 
appear to discard lower values obtained with 
other specifications). Excluding retirement 
accounts, the estimate is 18%.  Also, a 
calibration of their life-cycle model suggests 
an MPS around 15%. 
Imbens, G. W., D. B. Rubin and B. I. Sacerdote 
(2001), “Estimating the effect of unearned income 
on labor earnings, savings, and consumption: 
evidence from a survey of lottery players”, The 





United Kingdom. This paper uses micro data 
to estimate permanent income as a function of 
human capital, which is then used to estimate 
the marginal propensity to save out of 
permanent shocks. Average MPS found is 
18% and, among all specifications, it ranges 
between 5% and 30%. 
Miles, D. (1997), “A Household Level Study of the 
Determinants of Incomes and Consumption”, The 
Economic Journal, Vol. 107, No. 440, pp. 1-25. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2235268.pdf 
18 [5-30] 
United States. Friedman’s estimation of the 
MPC out of a permanent income, using annual 
per capita data for the period 1905 to 1951 
(excluding war years).  
Smyth, D. J. (1993), “Towards a theory of saving”, 
In J. H.  Gapinski (Ed.), The economics of saving 






United States. Aggregate data on disposable 
income and savings between 1959 and 1969 
(most recent period available in the paper). 
The central figure corresponds to the average 
of reported estimates (Table 1-4). 
Leabo, D. A. (1971), “The declining marginal 
propensity to save”, Business Economics, Vol. 6, 




International. Annual data on personal 
saving and personal disposable income for 22 
countries over the period 1953-1960 from the 
Friend, I. and P. Taubman (1966), “The aggregate 
propensity to save: some concepts and their 





yearbooks of National Account Statistics of 
the United Nations Statistical Office. Under 
the authors’ preferred methodology, the 
estimate of the MPS out of a permanent shock 
is in the neighbourhood of 15% to 20%. The 
central figure corresponds to the average of 
the two. 
Economics and Statistics, Vol. 48, No. 2, pp. 113-
123. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/1924628.pdf 
United States. Personal savings data from the 
US Office of Business Economics and 
financial assets data from the Security 
Exchange Commission. The range and central 
estimate of the MPS from normal income was 
collected from Table 1. 
Taubman, P. (1968), “A time series analysis of three 
measures of the same conceptual series”, The Review 





Canada. This paper extends the analysis in 
Dynan et al. (2004) to Canada. The MPS 
found ranges between 6% and 30%. 
Alan, S. and K. Atalay (2015), “Do the Rich Save 
More? Evidence from Canada”, Review of Income 




United States. Consumption and wealth data 
from 1955 to 1991. The MPS estimates were 
collected from Table 2: the central value 
corresponds to the whole sample period, while 
the MPS range includes estimates for 
alternative time periods.  
Stein, Sheldon H. and F. Song (1998), “The textbook 
consumption function: a recent empirical 
irregularity, a comment”, The American Economist, 




Germany. This paper uses a differences-in-
differences method to compare the saving 
behaviour of natives and immigrants in 
Germany, before and after a reform that eased 
citizenship requirements. The MPS of natives 
is between 17.7% and 18.3%, while the one of 
immigrants is 7 to 11 percentage points 
higher. 
Piracha, M. and Y. Zhu (2008), “Precautionary 
Savings by Natives and Immigrants in Germany”, 
Department of Economics Discussions Papers, 






Theoretical model calibrated. Under most 
simulated results, the MPS ranges between 
8% and 25% and the average value is 21% 
(Table 1). 
Carroll, C. D. (2009), “Precautionary saving and the 
marginal propensity to consume out of permanent 
income”, NBER Working Paper, No. 8233.  
http://www.nber.org/papers/w8233.pdf 
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save (see table 
A6.1 above) 
Ratio  
Canada  7.5 (1981-2016) 18 2.4 
Germany  11.9 (1960-2016) 18 1.5 
United Kingdom 8.4 (1955-2016) 18 2.1 
United States 8.3 (1969-2016) 14.3 1.7 
Average  9.0 17.1 1.9 
 





Table 1. Data sources 
 
. 





National Survey of 
































































OECD Datasets: Wealth Distribution Database
Eurostat: Mean Consumption Expenditure by 
Income Quintiles 2010
Eurostat: Distribution of Income by Quantiles 2014
Ameco's Adjusted wage share in selected OECD-Countries, 1990-2008 in Krämer (2011)
Literature sources in Annex A1.




Table 2. Excess mark-ups and price impact (all units in percentages) 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on sector weights from STAN Database and sector-specific mark-ups calculated 










Impact of market 
power on prices 
(∝)
Canada 17.7 10.1 7.6 8.4
France 19.2 10.2 9.0 10.0
Germany 20.9 10.3 10.6 11.8
Japan 15.5 9.9 5.6 6.2
Korea 20.5 10.0 10.5 11.7
Spain 20.0 10.4 9.6 10.7
United Kingdom 13.5 9.6 3.9 4.3
United States 16.7 11.0 5.7 6.4















Bottom 20 0.41 0.89 1.34 2.20
21 - 40 4.08 4.75 5.39 6.59
41 - 60 10.03 10.67 11.28 12.43
61 - 80 19.75 20.18 20.58 21.35
81 - 90 17.51 17.40 17.29 17.08
91 - 95 13.40 13.09 12.79 12.24
96 - 99 19.89 19.07 18.29 16.84
Top 1 14.93 13.96 13.02 11.28
Percentile
Wealth share absent market powerCurrent wealth 
share 𝑠 ′ = ?̅? 𝑠 ′ = 1.5 𝑠̅ 𝑠 ′ = 2 ?̅?
France   
Bottom 20 0.33 1.53 2.57 4.30
21 - 40 2.44 3.97 5.30 7.50
41 - 60 10.87 11.74 12.50 13.76
61 - 80 20.73 20.86 20.98 21.17
81 - 90 17.15 16.69 16.28 15.62
91 - 95 13.18 12.59 12.07 11.22
96 - 99 18.04 16.94 15.98 14.40
Top 1 17.27 15.67 14.28 11.98
Percentile
Wealth share absent market powerCurrent wealth 
share 𝑠 ′ = ?̅? 𝑠 ′ = 1.5 𝑠̅ 𝑠 ′ = 2 ?̅?
Germany
Bottom 20 -0.08 1.20 2.38 4.43
21 - 40 1.38 3.43 5.31 8.60
41 - 60 6.27 8.19 9.94 13.02
61 - 80 17.52 18.45 19.29 20.78
81 - 90 17.01 16.62 16.26 15.63
91 - 95 13.56 12.77 12.05 10.79
96 - 99 21.07 19.09 17.29 14.12
Top 1 23.28 20.23 17.45 12.57
Percentile
Wealth share absent market powerCurrent wealth 
share 𝑠 ′ = ?̅? 𝑠 ′ = 1.5 𝑠̅ 𝑠 ′ = 2 ?̅?
Japan   
Bottom 20 2.01 2.78 3.51 4.90
21 - 40 6.61 7.35 8.06 9.40
41 - 60 12.84 13.32 13.77 14.64
61 - 80 21.66 21.80 21.93 22.17
81 - 90 17.15 16.91 16.68 16.24
91 - 95 16.94 15.96 15.01 13.23
96 - 99 16.63 15.90 15.20 13.88
Top 1 6.15 5.99 5.84 5.54
Percentile
Wealth share absent market powerCurrent wealth 
share 𝑠 ′ = ?̅? 𝑠 ′ = 1.5 𝑠̅ 𝑠 ′ = 2 ?̅?
Korea   
Bottom 20 1.80 2.62 3.33 4.50
21 - 40 5.60 6.87 7.96 9.78
41 - 60 11.50 12.60 13.55 15.13
61 - 80 21.00 21.47 21.88 22.56
81 - 90 17.00 16.74 16.52 16.15
91 - 95 12.20 11.48 10.85 9.81
96 - 99 16.70 15.54 14.53 12.86
Top 1 14.20 12.69 11.38 9.22
Percentile
Wealth share absent market powerCurrent wealth 
share 𝑠 ′ = ?̅? 𝑠 ′ = 1.5 𝑠̅ 𝑠 ′ = 2 ?̅?
Spain   
Bottom 20 1.69 2.36 2.99 4.16
21 - 40 7.34 8.09 8.81 10.12
41 - 60 12.82 13.52 14.18 15.39
61 - 80 20.06 20.67 21.25 22.32
81 - 90 15.66 15.70 15.73 15.80
91 - 95 12.35 11.99 11.64 11.01
96 - 99 15.52 14.73 13.98 12.59
Top 1 14.55 12.96 11.46 8.68
Percentile
Wealth share absent market powerCurrent wealth 
share 𝑠 ′ = ?̅? 𝑠 ′ = 1.5 𝑠̅ 𝑠 ′ = 2 ?̅?
United Kingdom
Bottom 20 0.87 1.25 1.58 2.10
21 - 40 4.76 5.20 5.58 6.19
41 - 60 11.76 12.05 12.31 12.71
61 - 80 20.70 20.83 20.94 21.11
81 - 90 16.61 16.52 16.45 16.33
91 - 95 12.15 11.99 11.85 11.63
96 - 99 16.39 16.03 15.72 15.22
Top 1 16.75 16.12 15.58 14.71
Percentile
Wealth share absent market powerCurrent wealth 
share 𝑠 ′ = ?̅? 𝑠 ′ = 1.5 𝑠̅ 𝑠 ′ = 2 ?̅?
United States
Bottom 20 -0.92 -0.51 -0.13 0.55
21 - 40 0.90 1.65 2.35 3.63
41 - 60 3.13 4.20 5.20 7.01
61 - 80 9.14 10.42 11.62 13.78
81 - 90 10.86 11.41 11.93 12.86
91 - 95 12.08 12.04 12.01 11.96
96 - 99 27.95 26.60 25.33 23.04
Top 1 36.85 34.18 31.69 27.18
Percentile
Wealth share absent market powerCurrent wealth 




Table 4. Impact of market power on the wealth of the richest 10% of households (all units 
in percentages) 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations; see Table 3. 
  
Canada 48.2 46.1 44.1 40.4 4.4 8.5 16.3
France 48.5 45.2 42.3 37.6 6.8 12.7 22.5
Germany 57.9 52.1 46.8 37.5 10.0 19.2 35.3
Japan 39.7 37.8 36.0 32.6 4.7 9.3 17.8
Korea 43.1 39.7 36.8 31.9 7.9 14.7 26.0
Spain 42.4 39.7 37.1 32.3 6.5 12.6 23.9
United Kingdom 45.3 44.1 43.1 41.6 2.6 4.8 8.3
United States 76.9 72.8 69.0 62.2 5.3 10.2 19.1
Average 50.3 47.2 44.4 39.5 6.0 11.5 21.1
Country
Current wealth 
share of top 10%
Wealth share of top 10% without market power Rate of change in wealth (-)





Table 5. Impact of market power on income shares (all units in percentages)  
 
   
  
   
  






Bottom 20 4.39 4.87 5.01 5.28
21 - 40 9.68 10.35 10.56 10.94
41 - 60 15.37 16.01 16.21 16.57
61 - 80 23.31 23.74 23.87 24.11
81 - 90 16.56 16.45 16.41 16.35
91 - 95 10.80 10.49 10.39 10.22
96 - 99 13.09 12.27 12.02 11.56




Income share absent market power
𝑠 ′ = ?̅? 𝑠 ′ = 1.5 𝑠̅ 𝑠 ′ = 2 ?̅?
France   
Bottom 20 9.00 10.20 10.50 10.98
21 - 40 13.50 15.03 15.41 16.03
41 - 60 17.20 18.08 18.29 18.65
61 - 80 21.70 21.83 21.87 21.92
81 - 90 13.80 13.34 13.22 13.03
91 - 95 8.90 8.31 8.16 7.92
96 - 99 10.10 9.00 8.73 8.28




Income share absent market power
𝑠 ′ = ?̅? 𝑠 ′ = 1.5 𝑠̅ 𝑠 ′ = 2 ?̅?
Germany
Bottom 20 7.50 8.79 9.14 9.76
21 - 40 13.50 15.56 16.12 17.11
41 - 60 17.60 19.52 20.05 20.97
61 - 80 23.00 23.93 24.18 24.63
81 - 90 14.70 14.31 14.20 14.01
91 - 95 8.90 8.11 7.89 7.51
96 - 99 9.40 7.42 6.88 5.93




Income share absent market power
𝑠 ′ = ?̅? 𝑠 ′ = 1.5 𝑠̅ 𝑠 ′ = 2 ?̅?
Japan   
Bottom 20 10.78 11.55 11.78 12.23
21 - 40 15.09 15.83 16.06 16.49
41 - 60 18.30 18.78 18.93 19.21
61 - 80 23.21 23.34 23.38 23.46
81 - 90 14.37 14.13 14.05 13.91
91 - 95 5.66 4.68 4.37 3.80
96 - 99 8.28 7.55 7.33 6.91




Income share absent market power
𝑠 ′ = ?̅? 𝑠 ′ = 1.5 𝑠̅ 𝑠 ′ = 2 ?̅?
Korea   
Bottom 20 6.79 7.61 7.81 8.14
21 - 40 13.33 14.59 14.90 15.41
41 - 60 18.21 19.31 19.58 20.03
61 - 80 23.88 24.35 24.47 24.66
81 - 90 15.43 15.17 15.11 15.01
91 - 95 7.78 7.06 6.88 6.59
96 - 99 9.59 8.43 8.14 7.67




Income share absent market power
𝑠 ′ = ?̅? 𝑠 ′ = 1.5 𝑠̅ 𝑠 ′ = 2 ?̅?
Spain   
Bottom 20 6.00 6.67 6.87 7.23
21 - 40 12.20 12.96 13.18 13.59
41 - 60 17.30 18.00 18.20 18.58
61 - 80 24.00 24.61 24.79 25.13
81 - 90 15.90 15.94 15.95 15.97
91 - 95 10.00 9.63 9.53 9.33
96 - 99 10.40 9.60 9.37 8.93




Income share absent market power
𝑠 ′ = ?̅? 𝑠 ′ = 1.5 𝑠̅ 𝑠 ′ = 2 ?̅?
United Kingdom
Bottom 20 7.80 8.18 8.27 8.42
21 - 40 12.80 13.25 13.35 13.52
41 - 60 17.10 17.40 17.47 17.58
61 - 80 23.00 23.13 23.16 23.21
81 - 90 15.00 14.91 14.89 14.86
91 - 95 9.20 9.04 9.00 8.94
96 - 99 9.80 9.43 9.35 9.21




Income share absent market power
𝑠 ′ = ?̅? 𝑠 ′ = 1.5 𝑠̅ 𝑠 ′ = 2 ?̅?
United States
Bottom 20 3.69 4.09 4.21 4.42
21 - 40 9.45 10.20 10.42 10.81
41 - 60 15.31 16.38 16.69 17.25
61 - 80 23.69 24.97 25.34 26.01
81 - 90 17.15 17.70 17.86 18.15
91 - 95 11.70 11.67 11.66 11.64
96 - 99 12.53 11.17 10.78 10.07




Income share absent market power




Table 6. Impact of market power on the income of the poorest 20% of households (all units 
in percentages) 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations; see Table 5. 
 
Canada 4.4 4.9 5.0 5.3 10.9 14.2 20.3
France 9.0 10.2 10.5 11.0 13.3 16.6 22.1
Germany 7.5 8.8 9.1 9.8 17.1 21.8 30.1
Japan 10.8 11.5 11.8 12.2 7.1 9.3 13.4
Korea 6.8 7.6 7.8 8.1 12.0 15.0 19.9
Spain 6.0 6.7 6.9 7.2 11.2 14.5 20.6
United Kingdom 7.8 8.2 8.3 8.4 4.9 6.1 7.9
United States 3.7 4.1 4.2 4.4 11.0 14.1 19.9
Average 7.0 7.7 7.9 8.3 10.9 14.0 19.3
Country
Current income 
share of bottom 20%
Income share of bottom 20% without market power Rate of change in income
𝑠 ′ = ?̅? 𝑠 ′ = 𝑠̅𝑠′ = 1.5 ?̅? 𝑠′ = 1.5 ?̅?𝑠 ′ = 2 ?̅? 𝑠′ = 2 ?̅?
